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The paper presents a vintage capital model that is consistent with the
the relationship between the rate of embodied technical change and the rate
of entry and exit across industries. In the model, the costs imposed by the
regulation of entry may bias the sectoral composition of an economy towards
industries in which the rate of technical change is low — an eﬀect termed
technological skew. This prediction matches the empirical relationship between
institutional entry costs and several indicators of sectoral composition across
industrialized economies.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies an equilibrium model of entry and exit with sectoral choice. In
the model, a central determinant of the ﬁrm lifecycle is the rate of embodied technical
change (ETC): the rate at which the frontier technology moves ahead of incumbent
ﬁrms. The paper shows that the costs imposed by the regulation of entry may aﬀect
an economy’s sectoral composition, leading countries in which the cost of entry is
high to specialize in industries in which the rate of embodied technical change is low.
The model contains the following features. Industries diﬀer among themselves in
terms of the rate of ETC. Entrepreneurs direct their activity towards the industries
in which entrepreneurship is most proﬁtable. Caeteris paribus, the equilibrium fre-
quency with which entrepreneurs shut down and replace their ﬁr m si ne a c hs e c t o ri s
positively related to this rate, a result that is consistent with cross-industry data.
The sectoral composition of the model economy is endogenous, resulting from the
optimal decisions of entrepreneurs. Thus, the paper provides a tractable framework
in which to address questions of cross-country diﬀerences in industry composition.
2In particular, I focus on the regulation of entry as a factor of these diﬀerences.
The regulation of entry is an important nexus of public and private activity and,
moreover, the cost of entry is a central element of models of industry dynamics.1
As such, the costs imposed by the regulation of entry are a topic with potentially
signiﬁcant implications for theory and for policy. Cross-country diﬀerences in the
size of the service sector and the information technology (IT) sector have been the
object of much attention and, notably, these are sectors in which the rate of ETC
is relatively high. Moreover, both of these sectors tend to be smaller in countries in
which the costs imposed by the regulation of entry are high.2
The behavior of the model economy is consistent with these ﬁndings. If ﬁrms
are replaced more frequently in industries in which embodied technical progress is
rapid, entry costs may have greater impact in such industries. As a result, the model
predicts a relationship between sectoral composition and the magnitude of entry
costs. In particular, entry costs skew the composition of the model economy away
from industries in which the rate of ETC is high. I call this eﬀect technological skew.
Signiﬁcantly, the model does not require that the rate of ETC be correlated with
any other industry features, such as diﬀerent skill requirements or industry lifecycle
stages: in a canonical vintage capital model, the rate of ETC alone can deliver these
1See for example Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995).
2See Gust and Marquez (2004) and Messina (2005).
3results, through its eﬀects on ﬁrm dynamics.
Section 2 surveys the empirical relationship between entry, exit, and the rate of
ETC. Section 3 introduces the model, while Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium.
Sections 5 discusses the implications of the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical patterns of entry, exit and ETC
This section discusses the sectoral distribution of entry, exit and ETC across indus-
tries. It also surveys the recent empirical literature on the regulation of entry, and
reports some additional ﬁndings.
2.1 Entry and Exit
Recent work ﬁnds that entry and exit rates diﬀer persistently across industries.3
Industry entry and exit rates tend to be closely related to each other, and to dominate
any cyclical variations. This suggests that entry and exit are primarily due to
industry-speciﬁc factors, and that these factors are relatively stable over time. For
example, if technological factors are responsible, long-run diﬀerences in the rate of
technical progress might account for these cross-industry patterns, whereas transition
3Dunne et al (1988) study US manufacturing using the Census of Manufactures, whereas Brandt
(2004) considers data for both manufacturing and services, for several OECD economies, using data
from Eurostat and the OECD.
4dynamics or industry responses to aggregate shocks would be unlikely to do so.
In a comprehensive study of several industrialized countries, Brandt (2004) ﬁnds
the following patterns of cross-industry variation. First, IT-intensive industries ap-
pear to undergo particularly high rates of ﬁrm turnover. Second, rates of entry and
exit are higher in service sector industries than in manufacturing industries — see
Figures 1 and 2. Indeed, Brandt (2004) ﬁnds that industry ﬁxed-eﬀects for rates of
entry and exit are not signiﬁcant for most manufacturing industries, whereas they
are for most service industries. This suggests that the determinants of entry and exit
vary more substantially across the service sector (and between services and manu-
facturing) than across manufacturing industries.
FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE
2.2 Embodied Technical Change
This paper asks whether the rate of embodied technical change can account for
broad cross-industry patterns of entry and exit. The concept of ETC has been
found to account for several other features of industry dynamics: for example, in
a related model, Mitchell (2002) accounts for industry diﬀerences in the optimal
scale of production on the basis of industry diﬀerences in the rate of ETC, whereas
5Sakellaris (2004) and Samaniego (2006a) account for lumpy investment patterns at
the establishment level. Campbell (1998) develops a vintage capital model to account
for the cyclical variability of aggregate entry and exit.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Cummins and Violante (2002) provide industry indices of embodied technical
change for the United States. They ﬁnd that the rate of ETC varies signiﬁcantly
across industries. Moreover, these diﬀerences are highly persistent, dominating any
short-term variation. Thus, the industry rate of ETC is a technological factor that
satisﬁes the same broad properties as industry rates of entry and exit.
Furthermore, the rate of ETC is generally higher in service industries than in
manufacturing, and the rate of ETC is signiﬁcantly higher for IT than for other forms
of capital, as well as being higher in IT-intensive industries than in the remainder.
Thus, the pattern of entry and exit across industries is similar to the cross-industry
variation in the rate of ETC. Indeed, Table 1 shows that the industry-speciﬁce n t r y
and exit rates of Brandt (2004) and the ETC rates of Cummins and Violante (2002)
are signiﬁcantly positively correlated.4
4The industry classiﬁcations of the two data sets do not exactly correspond. In particular, the
ﬁnancial services sector and the retail sector are more disaggregated in the Brandt (2004) data.
"Not imputed" considers only industries with a direct correspondence, whereas "imputed" assumes
62.3 Sectoral Composition and The Regulation of Entry
It is signiﬁcant that the service and IT sectors have both been the object of recent
attention — because the size of these sectors is not uniform across countries, and
because they have been emphasized for their substantial statistical contribution to
employment and growth. Given that these are the sectors in which rates of entry and
exit are highest, one might ask whether cross-country diﬀerences in the way entry is
regulated could be responsible for these patterns of sectoral composition.
Furthermore, in industries in which the rate of ETC is high, ﬁrms may become
obsolete more rapidly than otherwise. Consequently, one might expect the sectoral
make-up of countries in which the costs imposed by the regulation of entry are high
to be skewed away from such industries. I term this eﬀect technological skew.I n
particular, it suggests that the service sector should be smaller in countries in which
entry costs are high, and that IT should be less prevalent. The paper henceforth
concentrates on these predictions as indicators of technological skew.
As a measure of institutional barriers to entry, the paper adopts the index devel-
oped by Djankov et al (2002), denoted ENT. As for indicators of sectoral composition,
service sector shares are reported in OECD (2000). Several measures of IT use are
available from Coppel (2000) and from Pilat and Lee (2001):
the same rate of ETC for all such industries in the Brandt (2004) classiﬁcation. "Not imputed"
considers 59 industries and "imputed" considers 37.
71. aggregate measures, including the share of IT in aggregate spending (ITSP),
and the share of IT in private sector employment (ITEMP); and
2. measures of capital use, including the log number of internet hosts (HOST),
the log number of secure servers (SERV) relative to the population,5 and the
number of personal computers per capita (PCS).
Data are available for 20 OECD countries. An advantage of concentrating on
industrialized economies is that it is not unreasonable to assume that they can draw
from a similar set of technologies. See Table 2 for a list of sectoral indices.
TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
Table 3 reports the correlation between ENT and each of the sectoral indicators.
These correlations are negative in all cases and highly signiﬁcant except for employ-
ment in the IT sector, which may be because limited production of IT does not
necessarily preclude its use. Figures 3 and 4 also reveal clear negative relationships.
FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE
5A host is any computer with full two-way access to the internet, whereas a secure server is
any computer that contains websites that may be accessed over the internet and which supports
encryption.
8A potential concern is that these relationships may be due to a separate policy
variable that is correlated with both ENT and sectoral composition. In particular,
Samaniego (2005) identiﬁes labor market regulations that make costly the ﬁring of
workers as just such a policy. Messina (2005) also argues that broad product market
regulation may be related to the size of the service sector. Hence, it is of interest to
see whether the inclusion of alternative policies aﬀects the results of Table 3.
Nicoletti et al (2000) provide measures both employment protection (EPL) and
product market regulation (PRO), and in what follows we shall consider these also.
In addition, other policies that directly aﬀect the ﬁrm lifecycle might also generate
technological skew.
TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE
Table 4 provides a comprehensive list of the policy variables considered, and the
Appendix outlines the reasons for their inclusion, as well as reporting the correla-
tions between the policy and sectoral make-up variables. Indeed, some of the policy
variables other than ENT are also negatively correlated with the sectoral indices,
although only for the case of EPL are the correlations of comparable magnitude.
Also, many of the policy variables are correlated amongst themselves — in particular,
the correlation between ENT and EPL is fully 51%. Thus, "policy clustering" does
appear to be a feature of the data, suggesting that simple correlations between policy
9variables and sectoral indicators should be interpreted with some caution.
On the other hand, Table 5 displays the results of regressing the set of policy vari-
ables on each indicator of sectoral composition. The policies with the most signiﬁcant
results are ENT, EPL and PUB. Thus, ENT does appear to be independently related
to sectoral composition. Coeﬃcients are standardized, which implies that an increase
in entry costs of one standard deviation is related to, for example, a decrease in the
share of GDP devoted to IT of about 40% of the cross-country standard deviation,
or a decrease in the PC base of 50% of the standard deviation. The evidence on
PUB is somewhat weaker, however, as it only appears related to the IT indices and
not to the size of the service sector.6
I conclude that the evidence is consistent with the presence of technological skew
resulting from the regulation of entry. This is robust to the use of several indices
of sectoral composition, to the inclusion of other forms of regulation as alternatives,
and to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Interestingly, there is insuﬃcient evidence to conclude
that there is an unambiguous relationship between sectoral composition and any of
the other policies — with the notable exception of employment protection.
6To check the robustness of these results, I regressed all combinations of the policy variables on
each of the sectoral indices, to see whether the sign of the relationship between sectoral composition
and the policy variables is sensitive to the number or identity of the policies included. The only
policy variables that are fully robust by this criterion turn out to be ENT and EPL.
103 Economic Environment
Time is continuous, and indexed by τ ∈ R.T h e r ea r eC countries, and two industries,
which may be interpreted as services and manufacturing, or as IT-intensive and non-
IT-intensive. Each industry i is characterized by an industry-speciﬁc parameter
gi ≥ 0 —t h er a t eo fembodied technical change. gi is the key technological parameter
of the model and will be discussed in brief. Good i sells at price piτ > 0.T h e r ei sa l s o
a numeraire good, with price 1 in each period. Product markets are competitive, and
there are no barriers to international trade. Hence, ﬁrms are price-takers, and prices
are common across countries. Countries diﬀer with regards to their institutions — in
particular, they diﬀer in terms of institutional entry costs, the cost of starting a new
ﬁrm. The entry cost in country c is Ec > 0, in units of the numeraire.7
3.1 Entrepreneurs
In each country, there is a unit continuum of entrepreneurs who maximize their
expected lifetime utility, discounting the future at rate ρ. At each moment in time,
an entrepreneur allocates a quantity 1 of a divisible, non-durable entrepreneurial
resource. This resource is useful for opening production sites.I feicτ units of this input
7De Soto (1990) and Djankov et al (2002) ﬁnd that the bulk of entry costs involves the time that
it takes to satisfy entry regulations. The numeraire may thus be interpreted as time or foregone
leisure.
11are used in any particular industry i in country c, the number of new production sites
generated is given by a function k(eicτ). k0 > 0 and k00 < 0, so there are decreasing
returns to entrepreneurship in each sector. In addition, limeicτ→+0 k0 (eicτ)=∞.
Once a production site is created, the entrepreneur may construct a ﬁrm there
at cost Ec in terms of the numeraire. At any date, the entrepreneur may close any
ﬁrm she is operating and replace it with a new one — also at cost Ec. Production
sites close exogenously at Poisson rate ζ.8 Let r = ρ + ζ.
Let Wicτ equal the expected value of a new production site in industry i,i n
country c at date τ. Then, each period τ, entrepreneurs in country c solve the









A ﬁrm in industry i is endowed with the production function yτ = egiv, where τ is
the date, yτ is output, and v is the vintage of its technology — the date at which
8Thus, the entrepreneurial resource may be interpreted as a sector-speciﬁc investment that
decays at rate ζ. ζ>0 is required for the environment to be stationary.
That entrepreneurs may be active across sectors is consistent with the ﬁnding of Lazear (2004)
that entrepreneurs tend to be generalists rather than specialists. That they do not create ﬁrms
across borders reﬂects the strong "home bias" found by French and Poterba (1991) inter alia.
12the ﬁrm was set up. Again, the key parameter is gi, the rate of ETC. The feature
that the productivity of an individual ﬁr md o e sn o tp r o g r e s sa tt h es a m er a t ea st h e
frontier is the deﬁning characteristic of vintage capital models.






where T is its planned lifespan.
One might not ﬁnd it surprising for entry costs to decrease the prevalence of
industries in which the rate of ETC is high if those industries are also relatively new.
To clarify that it is the rate of ETC itself that is responsible for the results, and
that no other industry characteristics are necessary, nor any transition dynamics,
the paper employs assumptions that generate a stationary model framework. In
particular, we assume henceforth that piτ = pi0e−giτ. I nar e l a t e dm o d e l ,M i t c h e l l
(2002) shows that this price sequence is consistent with demand being unit-elastic.9
Let t ≡ τ −v be a ﬁrm’s age. This will greatly simplify notation in what follows.
Deﬁne V (T;gi,p i0) as the expected value of a new ﬁrm in industry i with planned








The entrepreneur then solves the following problem at each production site:
Wicτ =m a x
T
©




The value of a production site does not depend on the date τ,s ot h a tWicτ =
W (gi,E c,p i0) for all τ. Hence, the entrepreneurial resource allocation problem is
time-invariant and, in equilibrium, eicτ = eic for all τ. In addition, ﬁrms in any
given industry will have a planned lifespan that does not depend upon the age of








W (gi,E c;pi0)k(eic). (5)
Let T∗ (gi,E c;pi0) denote the optimal ﬁrm lifespan which solves problem (4).
3.3 Industry evolution
In each country, industry i is characterized by a measure of ﬁrms μicτ (S),d e ﬁned over
Borel subsets of the real line. Firms that are at the technological frontier are either
at production sites that were just set up or that are the outcome of replacement. On
14the other hand, the measure of ﬁrms of other vintages decreases as production sites
close down exogenously or as the ﬁrms that occupy them are replaced.







qicτ (v)=0 for v>τ
˙ qicτ (v)=−ζqicτ (v) for v 6= τ
and where ˙ qicτ (v) is the derivative of qicτ (v) with respect to time τ.T h u s ,t h en u m b e r
of ﬁrms of a given vintage of technology would decline over time as production sites
shut down exogenously.
With replacement, however, the measure evolves in a more complicated fashion.
At the point that τ −v = T ∗ (gi,E c;pi0), ˙ qicτ (v)=−∞ as at that point the measure




qicτ (˜ v)I {˜ v = τ − T
∗ (gi,E c;pi0)}d˜ v (7)
qicτ (v)=0 for v>τand v<τ− T
∗ (gi,E c;pi0).
˙ qicτ (v)=−ζμicτ (v) for τ − T
∗ (gi,E c;pi0) ≤ v ≤ τ
Remark 1 As deﬁned, the measure is upper-hemicontinuous. There is a techni-
cal question concerning the treatment of ﬁrms that update v = τ − T∗ (gi,E c;pi0):
however, all treatments result in measures that are almost-everywhere equal to the
current speciﬁcation provided the measure has no mass-points. It is possible, though
notationally cumbersome, to extend the deﬁnition to more general measures.
4M o d e l S o l u t i o n
4.1 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 An entry equilibrium is a level of entry for each industry {eic} and a
function T∗ (gi,E c;pi0) such that:
(i) establishments are operated optimally, i.e. T∗ (gi,E c;pi0) solves problem (4);
(ii) the entrepreneurial resource is used optimally, i.e. {eic} solves problem (5);
16(iii) μic0 is given and, for τ>0, μicτ is determined according to equations (6)
and (7).
Deﬁnition 2 An entry equilibrium is a steady state if there exists a μ∗
ic such that
μicτ = μ∗
ic ∀τ ≥ 0.
The following condition is necessary and suﬃc i e n tf o rt h e r et ob ee n t r yi n t oa l l
sectors in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 For all i and c, eic > 0 if and only if gi < ¯ g(Ec,p 0i)= 1
Ecp0i − r (or,
equivalently, if and only if Ec < ¯ E (gi,p 0i)= 1
p0i(g+r).)
Lemma 1 may be interpreted as requiring either that entry costs are not so large
in any country that proﬁts are negative, or that the range of rates of ETC across
industries is not too broad. The discount rate r also matters because proﬁts are
delivered over time, whereas entry costs must be paid up-front at least once. We will
assume henceforth that gi < ¯ g(Ec,p 0i) for all i and c.
Proposition 2 T∗ (gi,E c;pi0) < ∞ exists and is unique.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique steady state entry equilibrium to which all
equilibria converge uniformly.
17Over a given time interval ∆ <T ∗ (gi,E c;pi0), a proportion ξ (∆,g i,E c;pi0) of
ﬁrms will exit either due to replacement or to the shutting down of the production
site where they are located. Deﬁne the steady state exit rate as X∗ (gi,E c;pi0)=
lim∆→+0
ξ(∆,gi,Ec;pi0)
∆ . Since the steady state measure is constant, the entry rate in a
given industry will equal the exit rate.
Proposition 4 The steady state rate of entry and exit X∗ (gi,E c;pi0) is negatively
related to T∗ (gi,E c;pi0).
What is the relationship between gi and rate of exit? Intuition might suggest that
∂T∗(gi,Ec;pi0)
∂g < 0:i fgi is relatively high, then ﬁrms fall away from the frontier faster
than otherwise and there is an incentive to close down and return to the frontier
sooner. Let us term this the "catch-up" eﬀect. However, diﬀerentiating the optimal

















Equation (8) has two parts. The ﬁrst is negative, representing the "catch-up" eﬀect.
However, the second has the opposite sign of
∂W(gi,Ec;pi0)
∂gi , and it is straightforward
to show that
∂W(gi,Ec;pi0)
∂gi is negative. This is because the beneﬁto fs t a r t i n gan e w
ﬁrm is lower when g is high since, once created, it will become obsolete at a faster
18rate. Let us call this the "give-up" eﬀect.
Since the "catch-up" and "give-up" eﬀects counteract each other, the sign of the
overall expression is not immediate. However, a closer examination of (8) suggests
that the importance of the "give-up" eﬀect may depend on whether W (gi,E c;pi0) is
very small — or on whether gi is close to ¯ g(Ec;pi0). Indeed:
Proposition 5 There exists a unique g∗ (Ec;pi0) > 0 such that T∗ (gi,E c;pi0) is
decreasing in gi if and only if gi <g ∗ (Ec;pi0). In addition, g∗ (Ec;pi0) < ¯ g(Ec;pi0).
Corollary 6 The exit rate X∗ (gi,E c;pi0) is increasing in gi if and only if gi <
g∗ (Ec;pi0).
Thus, if the rate of ETC is not too broad, the rate of entry and exit is highest in
industries in which ETC is rapid, as in the data.
Figure 5 illustrates the ﬁrm lifecycle for two values of gi in the interval (0,g∗).
In an industry in which gi is high, the productivity of a given ﬁrm falls behind that
of the frontier technology more rapidly. As a result, it is optimal to replace ﬁrms
more frequently. Nonetheless, at the point at which they are replaced, ﬁrms are
less productive relative to the frontier in "fast paced" industries than in industries
in which the technological frontier expands slowly. In ﬁgure 5,v a l u e so fgi are
chosen to represent the low and high range of the reported values by Cummins and
19Violante (2002), whereas pi0 and Ec are set arbitrarily. The ﬁrm lifespans are not
unreasonable, whereas g∗ for these parameters is over 34%. T h i si sc o n s i d e r a b l y
above the range of empirically reasonable values, as the maximum annual reported
industry ETC growth rate is under 9% (see Appendix). This suggests that the
assumption that gi <g ∗ (E,p) is not restrictive. Moreover, as argued in Section
2, the evidence is consistent with the condition that gi < ¯ g(Ec;pi0), in that the
industry entry and exit rates reported by Brandt (2004) are positively related to the
industry rates of ETC found by Cummins and Violante (2002).
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
4.2 Regulation of Entry
Recent work reﬂects an increasing interest in the regulation of entry. The detailed
case study of De Soto (1990) and the cross-country analysis of Djankov et al (2002)
argue that the regulation of entry is an important factor of aggregate outcomes, and
that the primary diﬀerence between entry regulation regimes appears to be the ex-
tent to which they impose costs on entrepreneurs. Fonseca et al (2001) and Bertrand
and Kramarz (2002) ﬁnd a relationship between entry costs and employment ag-
gregates. However, the cross-industry eﬀects of institutional entry costs have only
20recently begun to be addressed. Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) do not ﬁnd a
clear empirical relationship between the response of sector shares to entry regulation
in manufacturing data, whereas Messina (2005) ﬁnds that entry costs are negatively
related to the share of the service sector. The results of Section 2 also suggest that
entry costs are related to a relative absence of high-tech industries. I now ask how
the level of entry costs aﬀects sectoral composition in the model economy.









whenever Ec0 >E c and gi0 >g i.
Again, technological skew is the notion that industries in which technical change
is rapid are relatively more common in countries in which entry costs are low, whereas
countries in which the regulation of entry is costly are likely to end up with industries
that are less "fast-paced." The concept is deﬁn e di nt e r m so fe n t r yc o s t s ,b u ti s
applicable to other policies also.
Proposition 7
∂W(gi,Ec;pi0)
∂Ec < 0.M o r e o v e r ,
∂2W(gi,Ec;pi0)
∂Ec∂gi < 0 if and only if T∗ (gi,E c;pi0)
is decreasing in gi.
Proposition 8
∂2W(gi,Ec;pi0)
∂Ec∂gi < 0 if and only if g<g ∗ (Ec;pi0).
21Proposition 9 If gi <g ∗ (Ec,p i0) for all i and c, then the equilibrium displays tech-
nological skew.
Proposition 8 ﬁnds that, as conjectured, entry costs are most detrimental to
entrepreneurial activity in sectors in which the rate of ETC is high, provided the
range of gi is not too broad. Proposition 9 shows that, provided the rate of ETC is
not "too broad," high entry costs lead countries to specialize in industries in which
the rate of technical change is low. It is of note that, while the earlier results on
the relationship between ﬁrm and plant turnover assume that prices pi0 are constant
across industries, Proposition 9 does not depend upon the values of pi0.
5 Discussion: Extensions and Implications
5.1 Technology updating
The basic model requires entrepreneurs to start a new ﬁrm in order to adopt a new
technology. The model could be extended to allow ﬁrms to respond to the fact that
their technology is determined by vintage by updating their technology periodically.
Suppose now that entrepreneurs are able to update the technology at their old
ﬁrms without having to start a new one. Entrepreneurs are characterized by an
22idiosyncratic level of managerial ability α ∈ [0, ¯ α],w h e r eα is distributed over the
population of entrepreneurs according to a measure A. α is an index of her ability
to preserve ﬁrm value: it is the cost of adopting a new technology without having to
build a new ﬁrm.10
Once more, let W equal the value of a new production site in a given industry,
and let ˆ W be the value of a production site once the initial entry cost has been
incurred, so that W (gi,E c;pi0,α)= ˆ W (gi,E c;pi0,α) − E where:






ˆ W (gi,E c;pi0,α) − Ec, (9)
ˆ W (gi,E c;pi0,α) − α
io
Clearly there will be updating iﬀ α<E c.T h u s ,i f¯ α>E c, there is a bifurcation
whereby intrepid entrepreneurs always update, whereas others always replace their
ﬁrms. The former only pay entry costs once, so for them ˆ W (gi,E c;pi0,α) does not
depend upon Ec :
∂W(gi,Ec;pi0,α)
∂E = −1 and
∂2W(gi,Ec;pi0,α)
∂E∂g =0 . For these ﬁrms, there
is no systematic link between Ec and gi o ft h ek i n di nP r o p o s i t i o n7.H o w e v e r ,f o r
ﬁrms such that α>E c, the sectoral choice problem is the same as (4), since re-entry
10Chan et al (1990) account for the structure of venture capital contracts on the basis of a model
with entrepreneurial diﬀerences in managerial skill.
23is more proﬁtable than updating. Hence, Propositions 7 − 9 a p p l yd i r e c t l yt ot h e
activity of these entrepreneurs.
The empirical pattern of plant-level investment suggests that a large proportion of
plants do not signiﬁcantly change their technology over their lifetimes.11 Nonetheless,
this extension underlines an important aspect of the model: sectoral choice must be
at least partially irreversible. To put it another way, there must be some sector-
speciﬁcity to entrepreneurial activity, so that the expected returns from a unit of
entrepreneurial resource are related to the fate of more than one single ﬁrm.
5.2 Other extensions
The model presented above demonstrates that the regulation of entry leads to tech-
nological skew for the case of two industries. The results of the model apply to the
case in which there are I>2 industries, with some caveats. A suﬃcient condition
is that prices pi0 must be such that they do not overturn the result that entry costs
are more detrimental to proﬁts in industries in which gi is high. However, this is not
necessary. For example, in a model of occupational choice between entrepreneurship
and labor, Veracierto (2001) assumes that entrepreneurial output is based on the
11Doms and Dunne (1998) ﬁnd that most plant level investment occurs in widely-spaced "lumps"
that occur on average once every 6 years or more. Dunne et al (1989) ﬁnd that about 40% of
plants do not appear to survive for 5 years and, since their data is quinquennial, this is likely
to underestimate the true hazard rate. Identifying these "lumps" with signiﬁcant changes to the
production technology (see Samaniego (2006b)) suggests that most plants may not reach that stage.
24production function k(e)=¯ keβ, a functional form that is particularly useful for
quantitative applications. In this case, technological skew also holds for any number
of industries regardless of the price indices pi0.
Proposition 10 Suppose that k(x)=¯ kxβ. Then, for any I ≥ 2,t h ee q u i l i b r i u mi s
technologically skewed.
The assumption that prices decline exponentially over time delivers a stationary
e n v i r o n m e n t .A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ef a c tt h a ts e c t o rs h a r e sm a yc h a n g eo v e rt i m eh a s
received some attention. For example, Ngai and Pissarides (2004) account for the
dynamics of the service sector share on the basis of sectoral diﬀerences in productivity
growth. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting
to develop a general equilibrium extension in which the assumption of stationarity
could be relaxed, so that sector shares might display some transition dynamics. In a
diﬀerent context that does allow for transition dynamics on the basis of preferences
(not technology, as here), Messina (2005) shows that product market regulation
may account for a portion of cross-country diﬀerences in sector shares.12 None of
these papers have entry, exit nor ETC, and it would be interesting to quantitatively
assess the contribution of technological factors to these cross-country diﬀerences in a
12In that paper diﬀerences in sector shares are accounted for on the basis of diﬀerent income
elasticities across goods.
25suitable extension of the current paper. As discussed below, such an extension might
have signiﬁcant macroeconomic implications.
5.3 Macroeconomic implications
A sm e n t i o n e di nS e c t i o n2,t h ei n ﬂuence of the IT sector upon macroeconomic out-
comes has received a lot of interest lately. In particular, Oliner and Sichel (2000)
inter alia argue that a substantial part of the resurgence in US economic growth
in the late 1990s can be attributed to the diﬀusion of IT. This suggests that any
policies that discourage the use of IT could have important macroeconomic conse-
quences, and has prompted several studies to explore whether there is evidence of a
link between IT and cross-country macroeconomic performance.13
The above results suggest that countries with low entry costs may specialize in
industries in which embodied technical change is rapid, such as IT. Interestingly, this
would imply that entry costs may aﬀect not only the level of GDP but also its growth
rate. To see this, deﬁne γτ as the growth factor of GDP at time τ,c h a i n - w e i g h t e d









13See for instance Bassanini et al (2000), Pilat and Lee (2001) and Colecchia and Schreyer (2002).
26where qiτ is output in sector i during year τ. Along a balanced growth path, qi,τ−1 =






where σi is the nominal share of GDP of industry i. Technological skew implies that,
in an economy with high levels of entry costs, there will be a smaller (larger) share
of GDP in industries in which technical change is fast (slow). If so, the impact of
ﬁring costs upon industry composition may aﬀect long run growth rates in real GDP.
If the rate of technical change is a microeconomic determinant of industry location
and comparative advantage, then countries might be destined to diﬀerent medium-
or long-run growth rates based on their institutions. It is unusual to have a micro-
economic foundation whereby policy may have growth eﬀects rather than just level
eﬀects. The literature on "barriers to growth" related to Parente and Prescott (2000)
tends to focus on the cost of importing capital or monopoly as factors behind low
growth. This paper suggests that the regulation of entry could be another factor, as
well as any other policy that leads to technological skew.
275.4 Service sector data
Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2005) fail to ﬁnd a relationship between industry turnover
(as measured by turnover in the US) and industrial structure across countries. How-
ever, their data only includes manufacturing — the US Census of Manufacturing, and
the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Size-Distribution Database database. As noted,
Brandt (2004) ﬁnds that industry ﬁxed eﬀe c t sf o re n t r ya n de x i ti nm a n u f a c t u r i n g
industries are small and not statistically signiﬁcant in most cases, whereas they are
statistically signiﬁcant for almost all service sector industries. Similarly, Cummins
and Violante (2002) ﬁnd that rates of ETC tend to be lower in manufacturing than
in services. Hence, it may be that there is not enough variation in the determi-
n a n t so fe n t r ya n de x i t( s u c ha st h er a t eo fE T C )a c r o s sm a n u f a c t u r i n gi n d u s t r i e s
to yield clear results. Service sector data on output and prices are widely regarded
as suﬀering from measurement problems. However, the problems and virtues of data
on entry and exit should not depend on whether the industries in question include
services. Section 2 ﬁnds that rates of entry, exit and ETC are more limited in range
in manufacturing than across all sectors, suggesting that technological skew may be
most clearly visible in data that includes services. Thus, the results suggest that
it may be important for comparisons of cross-country industry structure to include
service sector data also, where possible.
286 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it provides a survey of entry, exit
and embodied technical change across industries, as well as the relationship between
these factors and institutional entry costs as reﬂected in broad sectoral composition.
Second, it shows that the observed patterns are consistent with optimal behavior in
a canonical vintage capital model with entrepreneurial choice. The paper shows that
the rate of ETC change may interact with entry costs, causing countries in which
entry is heavily regulated to specialize in industries in which the rate of ﬁrm-ETC is
low. The mechanism involves higher rates of ﬁrm obsolescence in industries in which
t h er a t eo fE T Ci sh i g h ,caeteris paribus.
More broadly, the paper articulates the notion of technological skew,w h e r e b ya
policy may cause countries to specialize in this manner. Although it has been found
to account for several features of industry dynamics, the usefulness of the concept of
embodied technical change for policy analysis has long been debated — see for example
Denison (1964) and Hulten (1992). This paper shows that, through its relationship
with establishment dynamics, the costs imposed by the regulation of entry can aﬀect
the distribution of industries across countries in a systematic way. Having identiﬁed a
new channel through which policy might have macroeconomic eﬀects — and possibly
growth eﬀects — it would contribute to this debate to explore what other policies
29c o u l dh a v et h i se ﬀect. For example, a general equilibrium extension of the model,
possibly in a multi-country setting, would be useful for addressing the long term
eﬀects of industrial policy that targets particular industries, as well as broad forms
of regulation such as those that impose institutional entry costs.
AD a t a
A.1 The concept of embodiment
The concept of embodiment used here in is that of ﬁrm-embodied technical change,
t h er a t ea tw h i c hﬁrms become obsolete. Cummins and Violante (2002) provide
industry indices of capital-embodied technical change for the United States.14 How-
ever, the evidence suggests that capital-ETC and ﬁrm-ETC are related, however. For
example, in a study of the aerospace industry, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) ﬁnd that
the value of used capital indicates the existence of large industry- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
components.15 For the case of IT capital, Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Brynjolfs-
son and Hitt (2000) and Brynjolfsson et al (2002) ﬁnd that the adoption of certain
changes to business organization, such as increased decentralization and the use of
self-managing teams, are central to whether IT investments result in productivity
14I am grateful to Gianluca Violante for providing me with data on embodied technical change.
15The authors argue is an industry in which these components are likely to be relatively small.
30improvements at the plant level. In a calibrated model of establishment dynamics,
Samaniego (2006b) ﬁnds that about 60% of economic growth can be attributed to
ﬁrm-embodied technical change, which is close to the value attributed to capital-
ETC in Greenwood et al (1997) and Cummins and Violante (2002). As a result,
the paper adopts the measure of Cummins and Violante (2002) as an indicator of
ﬁrm-ETC.
A.2 Entry costs and policy
Cross-country data on entry costs and policy are available for the following countries:
Austria (AUT), Australia (AUS), Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. :Including GDP per capita in the regres-
sions did not aﬀect results.
Aside from ENT, EPL and PUB, the following additional policies were included.
Samaniego (2006a) argues that most industrial support consists of transfers to fail-
ing establishments, so the presence of such subsides could constitute a potentially
important determinant of the decision to retire obsolete ﬁrms. Hence, I also con-
sider the proportion of GDP spent on industrial subsidies as reported in Ford and
Suyker (1989) — denoted IND. I also include two further variables from the Nicoletti
31et al (2000) data set: the extent of public ownership (PUB), and barriers to trade
(TRA). I include PUB for two reasons. First, Ford and Suyker (1989) and Leonard
and Van Audenrode (1997) point out that much industrial support may be implicit
through, for example, government ownership of establishments. Hence, national ac-
counts data may miss certain forms of industrial support that could impact resource
reallocation. PUB may be an indicator of omitted industrial support, and is the
only policy variable that has a strong correlation with industrial subsidies (see be-
low). Second, PUB may correlate with state investment in IT infrastructure, given
that IT has been the object of public attention in recent years. As a result, it is a
priori unclear whether one might expect PUB to be positively or negatively related
to IT use. As for trade barriers, they may matter because most of the countries in
the data set can be reasonably regarded as small open economies, and the layers of
the IT industry are distributed globally.
A.3 Summary statistics
Tables 6A−6C report the correlations between the diﬀerent policy and sectoral indi-
cators used in Section 2. The main observations are that (a) The sectoral indicators
are positively related amongst themselves; (b) the policy indicators are positively
related amongst themselves; and (c) for the most part, the policy indicators are
32negatively related to the sectoral indicators (the exceptions are ITEMP and TRA).
TABLES 6A − 6C ABOUT HERE
BP r o o f s








Otherwise, for all T, V (T) − E<0 and hence W<0. The Inada conditions imply
that there will always be entry when W>0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2. In most of the proofs below, I suppress the dependence






, so for the current proof assuming that p =1is without loss of
generality, since what follows depends upon the signs of derivatives only. It essentially
re-normalizes the units in which E is measured. Assuming an interior solution (T ∈
R+), the ﬁrst order condition to (4) is
V
0 (T (W)) = rWe
−rT(W) ⇒ e
−gT = rW (12)
33so, given W>0, the argmax is T (W)=−1
g logrW. The result follows provided it is
shown that there exists a unique W>0 such that W = V (T (W)) −E+e−rT(W)W,o r
that there is a unique zero of the function Q(W), where Q(W)=W
¡
1 − e−rT(W)¢
−V (T (W)) + E. It is straightforward to show that T (0) = ∞,s oQ(0) = E −
(r + g) < 0. Moreover, by the envelope theorem, Q0 (W)=1−e−rT(W) > 0,s ot h e r e
















exists and is unique.











k0 (eic)= ˜ Mc∀i
where Mc is the (endogenous) value of entry in country c,a n dw h i c hw i l lb ed e -






k0 (eic)= ˜ Mc.S i n c e eic is not optimal in country d,P r o p o s i -






















.I t h a s t o b e t h a t˜ Md ∈ U.






k0 (eid)=u. For any
given u, it may not be the case that
P
i eid =1— however, there is one and only one
such u for which this is the case, as
P
i eid will be decreasing in u.
As for the steady state measure, consider an economy in which μicv (S)=0 ∀S,v <






−ζ(τ−˜ v)eicd˜ v (13)
Deﬁne this measure as ˜ μ. Observe that ˜ μ converges uniformly towards a distri-




ζ (the number of production sites). Denote this measure μ∗
ic.
Now without loss of generality16 consider another economy with arbitrary con-
tinuous measure μicτ0 such that μicτ (S)=0for any S ≤ τ − T∗ (gi,E c;pi0).E a c h
period τ ≥ τ0, the measure μ will be











represents the inﬂuence of ﬁr m sb o r nb e f o r e ,w h i c hw a n e sa s




≤ μicτ0 (R) for any S. Thus, the measure
converges uniformly towards ˜ μicτ, and hence towards μ∗
ic.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4. T h ee x i tr a t eX∗ (gi,E c;pi0)=ζ + lim∆→+0˜ ξ (∆)/∆,
16If this condition were violated by any ﬁrms, they would update immediately so at time τ0 + ε
the condition would be satisﬁed.














Proof of Proposition 5. Again without loss of generality I assume that p =1
for this proof. Rearranging (8), ∂T∗
∂g < 0 if and only if −T∗ < ∂W
∂g . 1
W.I ti ss i m p l et o
show that W =( V − E)/
¡
1 − e−rT¢
,s ot h a t
−T
∗ (V (T



















Combining (17) with equations (11) and (18) yields the inequality V (T∗) <T ∗ [1 − E (r + g)]







∗ [1 − E (r + g)]. (19)










= τ [1 − E (r + g)]
¾
, (20)
which is the value of T∗ such that this expression (19) holds with equality. Thus,
∂T∗
∂g < 0 if and only if T∗ >τ ∗ (g).
At g =0 , T ∗ = ∞ so this expression holds. On the other hand, as g → 1
E −r (the
boundary beyond which positive entry is not proﬁtable), τ∗ →∞as the left hand side
of the expression in (20) is positive and ﬁnite, whereas limg→ 1
E−r [1 − E (r + g)] = 0.
Consequently, there must be at least one intermediate value such that T∗ = τ∗.C a l l
t h el o w e s ts u c hv a l u eg∗, and suppose there is another denoted g∗∗.A tb o t hg∗ and
g∗∗,b yd e ﬁnition, ∂T∗
∂g =0 .A tg∗∗, the derivative of T∗ w o u l dh a v et ob ez e r ob yt h e
deﬁnition of τ∗.A t g∗∗, ∂τ∗
∂g w o u l dh a v et ob el e s st h a no re q u a lt oz e r o ,h o w e v e r ,
since on the interval (g∗,g ∗∗) it is the case that ∂T∗
∂g > 0 and that T∗ <τ ∗. This is a




Proof of Proposition 7. Consider any ε such that 0 <ε<T ∗ (g,E;p). Deﬁne
the following Bellman equation:
Bv =m a x
T≥ε
©




37where v is a continuous and bounded function of parameters and B is the Bellman
operator. B satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃciency conditions for a contraction mapping —
see Theorem 3.3 from Stokey et al (1989). This implies that standard discrete time
recursive methods can be applied directly to characterize the solution to problem
(21), something that is not the case with the unrestricted problem (4). Hence, there
exists a unique W : BW = W. Clearly, the solution to problems (4) and to the ﬁxed
point of the Bellman operator in (21) will be the same, as the latter is a restriction
on the former that does not rule out the unrestricted optimum.
Suppose that ∂2v
∂E∂g < 0.F r o m e q u a t i o n(21), ∂Bv






∂E. Corollary 1 from Stokey et al (1989) then implies that, at






∂E .S i n c e∂W
∂E < 0, the sign of ∂2W
∂E∂g
i st h es a m ea st h es i g no f∂T∗
∂g .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8. Corollary of Propositions 5 and 7.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9. Label the two industries l and h such that gh >g l.
Also, pick two countries r and u such that Er >E u (r is for "regulated" and u is
for "unregulated"). In equilibrium, entry in either industry should yield the same









































































1.F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h a t∂2V





















 . This, along with















Consequently, ehu >e hr and elu <e lr.




























































1.F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h a t∂2V





















 .T h i s ,a l o n gw i t h


















ehu.S i n c eμ∗
ic =
eic
ζ , the result follows.
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Figure 1: Rates of Entry across the OECD 1997-2000, for Services and Manufacturing
(%). Source: Brandt (2004). *Data are from Eurostat, except for Italian and US
data which are from the OECD.












Figure 2: Rates of Exit across the OECD 1997-2000, for Services and Manufacturing







































































































































































































Figure 4: Entry costs and the Service Share in the OECD.





Productivity relative to the frontier: g=2%





Productivity relative to the frontier: g=7%
Figure 5: Equilibrium behavior at a production site, for diﬀerent values of g the rate
of embodied technical change. A production site is created at time zero, and the
ﬁrm that occupies the site falls steadily behind the frontier until it becomes optimal
to replace it. At this point, a new ﬁrm is established with the frontier technology,
and the cycle is repeated. r =7 % ,p =1 ,E =1 . A sf o rt h ev a l u e so fg,2 %a n d
7% correspond to the lowest and highest industry rates of ETC found by Cummins
and Violante (2002) in US data for 1947-2000 (for Agriculture and Communications,
respectively).
47ETC measure ENTRY EXIT
ETC, Imputed 53.5%*** 47.3%***
(0.11) (0.12)
ETC, Not imputed 44.7%*** 45.7%***
(0.15) (0.15)
Table 1 — Correlation of embodied technical change with rates of
entry and exit. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. An asterisk
(*) denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level, whereas two and three
asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Name Variable
ITSP Share of IT spending in GDP, 1992-1999.
ITEMP Share of IT in private sector employment, 1998.
PCS PC base: Average number of PCs per 100 people, 1999.
HOST Internet size: Log Internet hosts per 1000 people, 1999.
SERV E-commerce: Log Secure servers per million people, 2000.
S87 Service sector share, 1987.
S97 Service sector share, 1997.
Table 2 — Indicators of technological skew. Sources: OECD (2000),
Coppel (2000) and Pilat and Lee(2001).
ITSP ITEMP HOST SERV PCS S87 S97
Correlation -0.64*** -0.13 -0.63*** -0.58*** -0.60*** -0.64*** -0.45**
S.E. (0.18) (0.23) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20)
Table 3 - Correlations between entry costs and sectoral indices.
Name Variable
ENT Entry costs
EPL Employment protection measure
IND Industrial Subsidy rates1
PUB Extent of public ownership
PRO Product market regulation
TRA Barriers to International Trade and Investment
Table 4 — Policy indices.
48Dependent Policy Index #Obs Adj R2
Variable ENT EPL IND PUB PRO TRA
HOST -0.56*** -0.55** -0.38* 0.76*** -0.13 0.00 20 0.61
(0.17) (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) (0.28) (0.19)
SERV -0.30* -0.74*** -0.23 0.51** -0.22 0.02 20 0.71
(0.15) (0.21) (0.16) (0.21) (0.24) (0.16)
PCS -0.50** -0.44 -0.31 0.63** -0.24 0.07 20 0.44
(0.20) (0.29) (0.22) (0.29) (0.33) (0.22)
ITSP -0.39** -0.47* -0.27 0.31 -0.30 0.09 20 0.61
(0.17) (0.23) (0.18) (0.24) (0.28) (0.19)
ITEMP -0.23 -0.53 -0.02 0.92** -0.01 -0.14 20 0.32
(0.22) (0.32) (0.24) (0.32) (0.36) (0.24)
S87 -0.52** -0.58* -0.10 0.15 0.32 -0.12 20 0.34
(0.22) (0.31) (0.24) (0.31) (0.36) (0.24)
S97 -0.22 -0.90*** -0.22 0.24 0.43 0.10 20 0.39
(0.21) (0.30) (0.23) (0.30) (0.35) (0.23)
Table 5 — Sectoral composition and policy. Each row corresponds to a
regression, with dependent variables on the left-most column. Variables
are normalized by their means and standard deviations.
Variable ITSP ITEMP HOST SERV PCS S87
ITSP 1.00 - - - - -
ITEMP 0.17 1.00 - - - -
HOST 0.69 0.43 1.00 - - -
SERV 0.81 0.31 0.82 1.00 - -
PCS 0.76 0.39 0.90 0.84 1.00 -
S87 0.72 0.26 0.72 0.60 0.69 1.00
S97 0.63 0.20 0.67 0.58 0.59 0.87
Table 6A - Correlations among sectoral indices.
49Variable ENT EPL IND PUB PRO
ENT 1.00 - - - -
EPL 0.51 1.00 - - -
IND 0.06 0.20 1.00 - -
PUB 0.37 0.53 0.54 1.00 -
PRO 0.31 0.68 0.10 0.63 1.00
TRA -0.18 -0.06 0.13 0.30 0.41
Table 6B - Correlations among policy variables.
Variable ITSP ITEMP HOST SERV PCS S87 S97
ENT -0.64 -0.13 -0.63 -0.58 -0.60 -0.64 -0.45
EPL -0.78 -0.16 -0.60 -0.82 -0.59 -0.55 -0.62
IND -0.24 0.34 -0.12 -0.14 -0.10 -0.15 -0.25
PUB -0.41 0.50 -0.03 -0.26 -0.09 -0.24 -0.19
PRO -0.54 0.80 -0.23 -0.51 -0.29 -0.20 -0.15
TRA 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.22
T a b l e6 C-C o r r e l a t i o n sa m o n gE T Ci n d i c e sa n dp o l i c yv a r i a b l e s .
50